In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.  829, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia statute which made it a crime to divulge information regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission authorized to hear complaints of judges' alleged misconduct.  The Court concluded that neither preventing injury to the reputations of judges nor maintaining the institutional integrity of the judiciary constituted sufficiently compelling state interests to justify the infringement upon First Amendment rights.  435 U.S. at 841.  The Court further found that any risk posed by the disclosure of information did not constitute a clear and present danger to justify a curtailment of the First Amendment's guarantees.  Id. at 845.  The Supreme Court stated that "'the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished'." Id., quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941) (publication of "warnings" as to how judges should decide pending cases insufficient to justify contempt convictions) .  See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (rejecting prior restraint on publication of "Pentagon Papers").

__._,_.___

LANDMARK COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, 435 U. S. 829 (1978)

"Although

Page 435 U. S. 839

it is assumed that judges will ignore the public clamor or media reports and editorials in reaching their decisions, and, by tradition, will not respond to public commentary, the law gives "[j]udges as persons, or courts as institutions . . . no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions." Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 314 U. S. 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern.

"A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration. . . . Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not simply publish information about trials, but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."

"The Commonwealth concedes that, "[w]ithout question, the First Amendment seeks to protect the freedom of the press

Page 435 U. S. 840

to report and to criticize judicial conduct," Brief for Appellee 17, but it argues that such protection does not extend to the publication of information "which by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential." Ibid. Our recent decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, is relied upon to support this interpretation of the scope of the freedom of speech and press guarantees. As we read Cox, it does not provide the answer to the question now confronting us. Our holding there was that a civil action against a television station for breach of privacy could not be maintained consistently with the First Amendment when the station had broadcast only information which was already in the public domain.

"At the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records."
420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 496."